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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
employee's presence in the plaintiff's home in the instant case was in the
exercise of a privilege necessarily extended to him as an employee of a
telephone company. The employee's action was clearly an abuse of this
privilege.
It would seem, therefore, that the defendant company should be
liable since the commission of the tort constituted a breach of a special
duty owed to the plaintiff by the company. If this reasoning is fol-
lowed members of the public will be given protection from such inci-
dents when taking advantage of the conveniences which public utilities
were created to provide and in which its patrons have a right to share.
ROLAND C. BRASWELL.
Conflict of Laws-Divorce-Collateral Attack Barred by Laches
The jurisdiction of a state to grant a divorce is based upon the
domicile of one or both of the parties within the state at the commence-
ment of the action. Accordingly, a divorce decree rendered by a court
without such jurisdiction is not entitled to full faith and credit in other
states.' The finding of domicile by the divorce court is not conclusive
and is subject to collateral attack in other states by a party not person-
ally before the court when the decree was granted. 2
In a recent case3 H obtained a Nevada divorce decree from W-l,
a resident of the District of Columbia, who did not appear in the divorce
action. H, subsequent to the decree, married W-2. In a proceeding
before the Federal District Court in Florida, W-1 contended that the
decree was void as H was never domiciled in Nevada. The court held
that W-1, knowing of the divorce decree and delaying, without excuse,
for nearly twenty years, was now guilty of laches and estopped from
attacking its validity.
In theory the Nevada divorce decree was void and could not be
vitalized by delay or non-action of the deserted spouse. Some cases
have so held.4 Others have held that laches will attach by reason of
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U. S. 326, 229 (1944); Crouch v. Crouch,
28 Cal. 2d 243, 169 P. 2d 897, 900 (1946) ; Coe v. Coe, 136 Mass. 423, 55 N. E.
2d 702 (1944). For a complete list of cases see Note, 157 A. L. R. 1399 supple-
menting annotation in 143 A. L. R. 1294; GOODRICH, CONFLICTS OF LAWS §127
(3d ed. 1949).
2Rice v. Rice, 336 U. S. 674 (1949); RESTATEMENT. CONFLcrs OF LAWS §111,
comment a (1934).
8 Carpenter v. Carpenter, 93 F. Supp. 225 (S. D. Fla. 1950) (The court also
found that the evidence offered by W-I was insufficient to rebut the presumption
of H's domicile in Nevada.).
"McNutt v. McNutt, 366 Cal. App. 652, 98 P. 2d 253 (1940) ; Mills v. Mills,
119 Conn. 612, 179 Atl. 5 (1935); Field v. Field, 215 Ill. 496, 74 N. E. 443
(1905); Sammons v. Pike, 108 Minn. 291, 122 N. W. 168 (1903); Lawler v.
Lawler, 2 N. J. 527, 66 A. 2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Baumann v. Baumann, 250
N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929); Melnick v. Melnick, 147 Pa. Super. 564, 25
A. 2d 111 (1942); Richmond v. Sangster, 217 S. W. 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
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delay that works disavantage or injury to another.5 Under this latter
view, the application of laches must depend upon the circumstances of
each case.
In determining if laches should be applied, courts have considered
numerous factors. Whether the defendant had knowledge the divorce
was void has been given weight by some courts.6 Lapse of time caus-
ing prejudice due to the loss of material evidence by death of parties
or witnesses has also been thought to be of significance. 7 It has been
held that remarriage of the divorce plaintiff has no effect on the appli-
cation of laches.8 Yet, other cases have held that upon remarriage of
the divorce plaintiff the rights of innocent third parties have intervened
and may render it inequitable for the defendant to attack the validity of
the divorce." But, where the second spouse of the divorce plaintiff
encouraged the divorce or knew of the circumstances under which it
was obtained, the second marriage of the plaintiff has not been given
consideration in determining the applicability of laches.' ° Affirmative
acts of the defendant such as asserting the validity of the decree' or
remarriage 12 will constitute acquiescence and bar collateral attack. How-
ever, delay in attacking the foreign decree may be justified on the ground
that it was impossible to obtain personal service of process on the plain-
tiff within the state of the original domicile. 13
Assuming that a non-appearing defendant in a foreign divorce action
may be barred by laches due to an unreasonable delay in contesting the
Bliss v. Bliss, 50 F. 2d 1002 (D. C. Cir. 1931); McNeil v. McNeil, 170 Fed.
289 (9th Cir. 1909); Pawley v. Pawley. 46 So. 2d 464 (Fla. 1950); Reed v.
Reed, 52 Mich. 117, 17 N. W. 720 (1883); Sleeper v. Sleeper, 129 N. J. Eq. 94,
18 A. 2d 1 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941) ; Cope v. Cope, 123 N. J. Eq. 190, 196 Ati. 422
(Ct. Err. & App. 1938); Robinson v. Robinson, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 806 (Sup. Ct.
1946) ; Finan v. Finan, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 429 (Sup. Ct. 1944) ; McNeir v. McNeir,
178 Va. 285, 16 S. E. 2d 632 (1941); Dry v. Rice, 147 Va. 331, 137 S. E. 473
(1927); Wright Lumber Co. v. McCord, 145 Wis. 93, 128 N. W. 873 (1910);
see Note, 34 MINN. L. Ray. 514 (1950).
' Field v. Field, 215 Ill. 496, 74 N. E. 443 (1905); Wright Lumber Co. v.
McCord, 145 Wis. 93, 128 N. W. 873 (1910).
' Reed v. Reed, 52 Mich. 117, 17 N. W. 720 (1883); Dry v. Rice, 147 Va.
331, 137 S. E. 473 (1927).
8 Bethune v. Bethune, 192 Ark. 811, 94 S. W. 2d 1043 (1936); Mills v. Mills,
119 Conn. 612, 179 At!. 5 (1935); Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y. 382, 165
N. E. 819 (1929); Sitterly v. Sitterly, 186 Misc. 31, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 424 (Sup.
Ct. 1945); Melnick v. Melnick, 147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A. 2d 111 (1942); Rich-
mond v. Sangster, 217 S. W. 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920).
'McNeil v. McNeil, 170 Fed. 289 (9th Cir. 1909); Sammons v. Pike, 108
Minn. 291, 122 N. W. 168 (1903); Sleeper v. Sleeper, 129 N. J. Eq. 94, 18 A.
2d 1 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941) ; Cope v. Cope, 123 N. J. Eq. 190, 196 Atl. 422 (Err.
& App. 1938); McNeir v. McNeir, 178 Va. 285, 16 S. E. 2d 632 (1941); Dry v.
Rice, 147 Va. 331, 137 S. E. 473 (1927).
"0 Lawler v. Lawler, 2 N. 3. 527, 66 A. 2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Pomerance
v. Pomerance, 187 Misc. 20, 61 N. Y. S. 2d 227 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
" Marcus v. Marcus, 194 Misc. 464, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 830 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
2 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICTS oF LAWS §112 (1934).
"1 Melnick v. Melnick, 147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A. 2d 111 (1942).
19511
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
validity of the divorce decree, what remedies are available to the de-
fendant if sought within a reasonable time?
A court of equity may enjoin the prosecution of an action in another
state by a citizen of its own state. Such an injunction is not a violation
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause or the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Federal Constitution; nor does it violate the comity rela-
tions that exist between the several states.14  In such cases the decree
of the court is based on personal jurisdiction and directed to the party
and not the tribunal where the suit or proceeding is pending. Where
both parties are domiciled in the same state, the deserted party may
obtain an injunction, restraining his spouse from further prosecuting
divorce proceedings commenced by him in a court of another state.15
Injunction would seem proper in such a case to prevent evasion of the
laws of the domicile, great expense and hardship in defending in an-
other state, uncertainty of the marital status, and embarrassment of the
deserted party. If the foreign divorce has not been commenced but
merely threatened, there is conflicting authority whether an injunction
will issue.16 In any event injunction will only lie where the deserting
spouse has not established a bona fide domicile in the state in which
the divorce is sought.17
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Federal Constitution does
not prevent a collateral attack in one state on a divorce decree rendered
in another state upon the ground that neither party was domiciled at
the divorce forum.' 8  Such an attack may arise out of a separate action
for divorce brought by the non-appearing defendant.19 Should the de-
serted spouse be the wife, the validity of the decree may be questioned
1 28 Am.' Jtu 389, IIqJuNcrIoN §204; Jacobs, The Utility of Injunctions and
Declaratory Judgments it Migratory Divorce, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 370, 374(1935).
"Usen v. Usen, 136 Me. 480, 13 A. 2d 738 (1940); Ippolito v. Ippolito, 3
N. J. 561, 71 A. 2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1950); Ward v. Ward, 6 N. J. Super. 130, 70
A. 2d 502 (1950) ; Gross v. Gross, 13 N. J. Misc. 449, 180 AtI. 204 (Ch. 1935) ;
Knapp v. Knapp, 12 N. J. Misc. 599, 173 Ati. 343 (Ch. 1934); Barzilay v. Bar-
zilay, 75 N. Y. S. 2d 428 (Sup. Ct. 1947) ; Pereira v. Pereira, 272 App. Div. 281,
70 N. Y. S. 2d 763 (1st Dep't 1947) ; Borda v. Borda, 44 R. 1. 337, 117 AtI. 362(1922). But cf. Gaskell v. Gaskell, 189 Misc. 504, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 440 (Sup. Ct.
1947) (injunction against the prosecution of a divorce action in a foreign country
was denied).
" Kahn v. Kahn, 325 Ill. App. 137, 59 N. E. 2d 874 (1945) (injunction issued
restraining the commencement of a foreign divorce) ; Carr v. Carr, 52 N. Y. S.
2d 386 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (injunction denied) ; accord, DeRaay v. DeRaay, 255 App.
Div. 544, 8 N. Y. S. 2d 361 (1st Dep't 1938), aff'd, 280 N. Y. 822, 21 N. E. 2d
879 (1939).
" Smith v. Smith, 364 Pa. 81, 70 A. 2d 630 (1950).
" Rice v. Rice, 336 U. S. 674 (1949) ; BEALE, TEE CONFLICTS OF LAWS §111.2(1935).
9 Crouch v. Crouch, 28 Cal. 2d 243, 169 P. 2d 897 (1946) ; Bobala v. Bobala,
68 Ohio App. 63, 33 N. E. 2d 845 (1940) ; Sitterly v. Sitterly, 186 Misc. 31, 58
N. Y. S. 2d 424 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
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in an action for support.20  In both actions, if the foreign decree is
pleaded as a defense, the court may inquire into the jurisdiction of the
foreign court.2
1
The deserted spouse may also resort to the declaratory judgment,
requesting the court to determine the marital status of the parties. If
it is successfully proved that the plaintiff in the divorce action was not
domiciled at the divorce forum the court will adjudge the foreign divorce
decree null and void.22  That a declaratory judgment is an appropriate
remedy seems well settled today2 3  In such a case there is an actual
controversy as one spouse asserts that the foreign divorce is valid and
the other contends that it is not.2 4 Both have an interest in the marital
status; and if the deserted spouse does not wish a divorce or support,
there is no adequate remedy at law.25 Thus, the action will settle the
status and terminate the controversy.
2 6
These remedies seem to afford the non-appearing defendant in a
foreign divorce suit adequate protection of his or her marital status
and property rights. Reasonably prompt action would prevent the re-
sult of the principal case.
ROBERT M. WILEY.
Federal Courts-Civil Rights Act-Stay of State
Criminal Proceedings
In 1793, Congress, apprehending the danger of encroachment by fed-
eral courts upon the jurisdiction of state courts, passed a statute pro-
hibiting the enjoining of proceedings in state courts by courts of the
United States.' This statute, with but one amendment, 2 remained
" White v. White, 150 F. 2d 157 (D. C. Cir. 1945) ; Evans v. Evans, 149 F.
2d 831 (D. C. Cir. 1945) ; Atkins v. Atkins, 386 Ill. 345, 54 N. E. 2d 488 (1945);
Phelps v. Phelps, 154 Pa. Super. 270, 35 A. 2d 530 (1944).2 Note, 157 A. L. R. 1399 (1945).
" Mills v. Mills, 119 Conn. 612, 179 AtI. 5 (1935) ; Hogan v. Hogan, 320 Mass.
658, 70 N. E. 2d 821 (1947) ; Lawler v. Lawler, 2 N. J. 527, 66 A. 2d 855 (Sup.
Ct. 1949) ; Henry v. Henry, 140 N. J. Eq. 21, 144 Atl. 18 (Ch. 1928) ; Lowe v.
Lowe, 265 N. Y. 197, 192 N. E. 291 (1934); Baumann v. Baumann, 250 N. Y.
382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929); Altholy v. Altholy, 72 N. Y. S. 2d 143 (Sup. Ct.
1947); Smerda v. Smerda, 74 N. E. 2d 751 (Ohio 1947); Melnick v. Melnick,
147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A. 2d 111 (1942); BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS
478 (2d ed. 1941) ; see Jacobs, The Utility of Injunctions and Declaratory Judg-
inents in Migratory Divorce, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 370, 391 (1935).
BORcHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 479 (2d ed. 1941).
24 Melnick v. Melnick, 147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A. 2d 111 (1942).
"Henry v. Henry, 140 N. J. Eq. 21, 144 Atl. 18 (Ch. 1928) ; Melnick v. Mel-
nick, 147 Pa. Super. 564, 25 A. 2d 111 (1942).
" Hogan v. Hogan, 320 Mass. 658, 70 N. E. 2d 821 (1947).
S,. . .nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any
court of a state." Act of March 2, 1793, c. 22, §5, 1 STAT. 334 (1793), as
amended, REv. STAT. §720 (1875), 28 U. S. C. §379 (1926), 62 STAT. 968, 28
U. S. C. §2283 (1948). This statute has been held not to be jurisdictional, but
1951]
